In its first decision of the year, Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1, the Court released its reasons for dismissing the appeal of Jessica Ernst, an Albertan who was suing, amongst others, the Alberta Energy Regulator for breaching her Charter-protected freedom of expression and seeking Charter damages for that alleged breach. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the immunity clause in s. 43 of the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Act had the effect of barring her claim for Charter damages. In a strange 4:1:4 split, a majority of the Court held that it did. Continue reading →
As 2016 fades into the distance, I thought that it might be useful to look back and see what were some of the biggest constitutional developments in the Old Year. There were many but I think that a few stand out for me. A number do not involve constitutional judicial determinations but they are major Canadian constitutional developments nonetheless.
Only rarely will the Supreme Court rule on a Charter issue of importance from the bench. And that is what has happened today. The Court has overturned the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s ruling, and reinstated the determination of the trial judge. In a previous post, I had commented on the Court of Appeal decision.
The case will no doubt be appealed to the Supreme Court where yet another discussion about the refurbished freedom of association will ensue. The careful discussion by the Chief Justice and Justice Harris (as well as by the dissenting judgment of Justice Donald), dissecting the importance of good faith consultation and discussions with collective representatives from the equally important legislative capacity to impose one or more labour provisions for the sake of public policies, including fiscal prudence, will be of great assistance to that Court when considering just how far the Charter value for associational freedom should go when faced by a government making decisions about such things as educational policy (size of classes and curriculum as examples) and the public purse.
Well, I sure was wrong: the Supreme Court evidently had enough careful discussion and wanted direct action. I will report more on this when a copy of the oral ruling becomes available.
Yesterday, I did two things of note. First, I listened with interest to a webinar sponsored by our Constitutional and Human Rights Law Section of the Canadian Bar Association entitled “Access to Information at a Crossroads: Implications of the Long-gun Registry Case”. Second, I watched the televised returns of the American election.
Notwithstanding its title, the webinar was about rule of law and how access to information is inextricably interwoven with that concept. Its speakers were Suzanne Legault, Information Commissioner of Canada, and Dr. Vincent Kazmierski, Department of Law and Legal Studies of Carleton University. Using the Long-gun Registry case as an example, the speakers illustrated how the rule of law was involved and perhaps even imperilled from various perspectives. Dr. Kazmierski presented a thesis that postulated that the government of the day abused its powers to overwhelm legitimate rights to access to information and that, in so doing, disrespected essential elements of the principle of rule of law. (You can probably still listen to the excellent webinar by contacting the CBA Professional Development at email@example.com.)
On October 27, 2016, the Prime Minister named nine new senators to the Senate, with 12 more to be appointed in the coming days. These new “independent, non-partisan” senators along with their future fellow colleagues will soon comprise the largest “bloc” of senators in the Upper House, surpassing the Conservative senators. What Prime Minister Trudeau has done by moving to a non-partisan, merit-based appointment process is major parliamentary reform, all without the need for any constitutional amendment whatsoever.
This week Prime Minister Trudeau announced that, henceforth, the federal government would be following a new process for appointing new justices to the highest court. In article published in The Globe and Mail on August 2, 2016, “Why Canada has a new way to choose Supreme Court judges”, the Prime Minister outlined the basic elements of the reform to the naming of Supreme Court justices. They can be summarized as follows: Continue reading →
This is just a quick post to note that Bill C-14 in the more restricted format passed by the House of Commons – for the second time – was just approved by the Senate by a 44 to 28 vote. Earlier, the Senate had returned the Bill to the House of Commons with a substantial majority of Senators agreeing that the House of Commons’ version was too restricted, especially considering the requirement that a person seeking medical assistance in dying (“MAID”) be at the point where his or her natural death was “reasonably foreseeable”. Constitutional experts had testified before the Senate to the effect that this version of the Bill was unconstitutional because it stripped away rights from a group of persons that the Supreme Court of Canada had expressly determined were theirs. So what next?
Government ministers and opposition leaders were in a flap this last week. The Senate dared to amend Bill C-14, the bill on physician-assisted dying and strike out one of the qualifications that the House of Commons had insisted on – namely, that natural death be reasonably foreseeable. Opposition Leader Rona Ambrose stated in response on June 9, 2016:
“We have the courts making laws in this country and now we have an unelected Senate changing the laws of an elected House….”
Minister of Health Jane Philpott stated that the government was “concerned” about the amendments to a bill that “has been supported by a vote in the House of Commons”. Justice Minister Jody Wilson-Raybould called the amendment a “significant one” and said that it would “broaden the regime of medical assistance in dying in this country and we have sought to ensure that we, at every step, find the right balance that is required for such a turn in direction.”
Today, in Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 1038 Chief Justice Chris Hinkson of the BC Supreme Court awarded Ivan Henry Charter damages of $7.5 million for the violation of his Charter rights resulting in his wrongful conviction and imprisonment for 27 years. He also awarded about half a million dollars for compensation as compensation for past loss of income and special damages of about $50,000. But after considering the “cap” on non-pecuniary damages and deciding that it was not applicable in this case, the Chief Justice sought to “vindicate” the wrongs of the British Columbian government.
Bearing in mind the direction of Chief Justice McLachlin in Ward that just as private law damages must be fair to both the plaintiff and the defendant, so s. 24(1) damages must be fair — or “appropriate and just” — to both the claimant and the state, and weighing the social burden of a large award to Mr. Henry against his suffering and loss of amenities, I find that an appropriate award to vindicate the violation of Mr. Henry’s Charter rights is the sum of $7.5 million.
I will expand on this case in a later post. In the interim, I wanted to let you know of this important decision. Click here to go directly to the decision.
In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Ewert v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 BCSC 962, Mr. Justice Blok certified as a class action certain aspects of a lawsuit brought by an inmate for, amongst other things, damages for violations of Charter rights. The inmate in question, Jeffery Ewert, claimed that, during a lockdown at the Kent Correctional Institution that occurred between January 7 and 18, 2010, his rights and the rights of other inmates under ss. 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter were violated and that they were accordingly entitled to damages.