Is Indigenous governance constitutional law?

Kitwanga, ca. 1899, Canadian Museum of History

Before the CoVID19 pandemic seized control of our daily diet of news, Canada was wrestling with blockades of railroads, pipeline projects and ports. These blockades were fueled by a debate over Indigenous sovereignty and questions abounded about who needed to be consulted – the traditional chiefs or the elected band chiefs. With CoVID19, these issues seem to have vanished from our consciousness. But the underlying issue has not gone away.

Indeed, during the pandemic, Indigenous sovereignty and governance is being exercised in often very direct ways. For instance, due to the threat from the coronavirus, the governments of the Haida, the Heiltsuk Nation, and Ahousaht First Nation have issued orders that forbid travel from others into their territories. Interestingly, most people are respecting these orders, including the Province of British Columbia.

This flexing of Indigenous jurisdictional muscle, whether it be in relation to mega-projects being built over their lands or in respect of orders issued against non-member travel during the pandemic, begs constitutional questions. But how do Indigenous jurisdiction and Indigenous governance fit into the Canadian constitutional puzzle?

Canadian constitutional law has many components. These components include:

  • a division of powers between the federal and provincial orders of government dating from Constitution Act, 1867 (previously the British North America Act) ;
  • the “unwritten” constitution inherited from the United Kingdom that regulates Canada’s system of parliamentary democracy;
  • a Charter of Rights and Freedoms enacted as part of the Constitution Act, 1982 and which placed constitutional limits to the bounds of State power when intruding into areas of certain areas of human autonomy and dignity; and
  • a constitutional amending formula, also adopted in 1982.

Missing from this list is the matter of Indigenous governance and jurisdiction. Under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, “Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians” was one of the matters exclusively reserved for the federal government and Parliament. But that did not really deal with the matter of Indigenous sovereignty and thus, Indigenous governance and jurisdiction. For that, we need to turn to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The first paragraph of section 35 simply states:

“The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”

Notwithstanding its simplicity and brevity, section 35(1) has become one of the most important constitutional provisions for Indigenous rights. It has been used in relation to hunting and fishing rights, in relation to rights to take and exploit timber, and importantly to protect claims of aboriginal ownership to lands. But now, it may well be a key constitutional component for the protection and recognition of Indigenous governance and Indigenous law-making jurisdiction.

Indigenous nations have always asserted that, at no time, did they cede their right to govern themselves and their lands. And indeed, a number of judicial decisions seem to have recognized that this right to govern themselves existed and that it existed long before any constitutional amendment in 1982. But the federation of Canada has acted for over a century and a half as if the only constitutional actors that counted were the federal parliament and government and the provincial and territorial legislatures and governments.

If an aboriginal right extends to an Indigenous people to hold aboriginal title to their ancestral lands and that aboriginal right is protected by section 35, then it is logical that their ancestral right to administer those lands and themselves as an aboriginal people is also protected by section 35. Indigenous nations are now using this logic and turning to section 35 to give constitutional teeth to a right that they have long exercised and maintained: a right to govern themselves and their lands.

But the constitutional inquiry into Indigenous governance does not stop there. The existence of an aboriginal right of governance, constitutionally protected and recognized by section 35, begs the next question, namely, how to “fit” Indigenous jurisdiction and governance into the Canada constitutional framework. In essence, section 35 recognized and affirmed a third order of government within or juxtaposed to the Canadian federation. Not only are there provincial and federal governments and legislatures but there are also indigenous governments and law-making institutions and, it is submitted that these have been implicitly “recognized and affirmed” by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Thus, Indigenous governance truly is a branch of constitutional law. How Indigenous peoples “constitute” themselves, how they govern themselves, their institutions and their lands and those within their lands is a matter of constitutional law. How Indigenous governments, institutions and laws interact or fit within or adjacent to federal and provincial governments, legislatures and laws may be one of the most significant, unsettled constitutional law issues facing Canada today.

While section 35 does not provide explicit answers to questions as to how this all fits together, it does provide the express constitutional link from the Canadian federation and its Constitution to the self-governing Indigenous nations within Canada. And it is incumbent on all actors within Canada to be conscious of these questions and to seek constructive responses within the concept of reconciliation.

For more information about these important constitutional issues, please contact Arthur Grant at agrant@gkn.ca.

I remain

Constitutionally yours,

Arthur Grant

The Minister and the Grizzly Bear Spirit: Another Indigenous People Loses to “Reasonable Consultation”

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BC’s Selkirk Mountains as seen from space: NASA

On November 3, 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that, yet another part of a First Nation’s claimed traditional territory could be subject to permanent development because the government had conducted “reasonable consultation”. In Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests, Lands and Resources), 2017 SCC 54, the Court delivered a double blow to the Indigenous Nation. Not only did the Court hold that the Indigenous Nation’s freedom of religion was not infringed by the government’s decision to approve a year-round ski resort development on their claimed sacred grounds but the Court also found that the Minister had reasonably consulted the Indigenous Nation and that, therefore, the governmental approval was upheld. There are a number of perspectives to this case so this blog post will actually be considering:

1. Freedom of religion;
2. Reasonable consultation and accommodation; and
3. Supreme Court of Canada appointments.

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The Supremes give a lesson on the duty to consult and accommodate

On July 26, 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered two much awaited decisions respecting the duty of the National Energy Board to consult and accommodate the aboriginal rights of two distinct Indigenous peoples for two distinct projects. In one, Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geoservices Inc., 2017 SCC 40, a tiny Inuit community from Nunavut convinced the Court that it had not been deeply and meaningfully consulted or reasonably accommodated and therefore, the National Energy Board’s approval of the petroleum-testing project was overturned and quashed. In the other, Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., 2017 SCC 41, the Court held that the NEB had appropriately and sufficiently consulted and then accommodated the southwest Ontarian Indigenous nation and upheld the NEB’s approval of Enbridge’s project. Of note, the Court ordered that the Chippewas of the Thames pay Enbridge’s costs.

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Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia – the Dawning of a New Era

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The Chilcotin, British Columbia

On Thursday, June 26, 2014, the constitutional framework of Canada experienced an earthquake. Whether it was an earthquake of Richter scale 7 or 8, I cannot say. But let no one think otherwise – this was a big one. Whether it was the Big One or not will remain to be seen. For the first time in Canadian history, there has been a finding that a First Nation has established their claim to Aboriginal title. The Supreme Court of Canada decided in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 that the Tsilhqot’in Nation has proven its Aboriginal title to a swath of some 1900 square kilometers in the interior of British Columbia. What precipitated the action in which the claim was made was the Province’s issuance of timber harvest licences without consultation to the First Nation in question. Now, not only are the timber harvest licences invalid but the provincial Forest Act is now constitutionally inapplicable to those 1900 square kilometres. This is just the first claim of hundreds. After this decision, governments across the country are running back to check the claims of the First Nations resident in their territories – just how strong are those claims to Aboriginal title? – did those treaties really extinguish Aboriginal title or were they some sort of lesser treaty? – have the First Nations been consulted and accommodated in accordance with the Court’s dictates?

The Chief Justice spoke for the full court. In a relatively short 153 paragraph judgment that was clearly crafted with care and that united the various themes and principles that have been articulated in previous cases, she pronounced on the requirements for proving Aboriginal title, the rights conferred by Aboriginal title, the duties owed by the provincial government at the time of infringement and the ongoing ability of the provincial government to legislate and govern in respect of the Aboriginal title lands. While I cannot do it justice in a single post, I will touch upon some of the highlights and then discuss what I think this judgment means in the long term.

Before I go there, however, I want to present the thesis that this is not simply an Aboriginal law case focussing on Aboriginal title: it is fundamentally a constitutional law case. Because of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, in my view, the import of this decision is that the First Nations of this country must now be engaged as full actors in our constitutional framework and not merely as historical irritants that must be somehow assuaged before moving on to getting the business of the country done. This is what makes this case so earthshaking in my view.
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